Benchmarks · GenIaC-SecBench

GenIaC-SecBench: infrastructure security results

Claude Opus 5.5 wrote infrastructure from 100 prompts across AWS, Azure, GCP and Kubernetes. We ran each prompt three times with LeoPrevent and three times without it.

LeoTrace2 November 2026

33%

of infrastructure-as-code prompts with no security guidance produced vulnerable code without LeoPrevent.

5 of 15 prompts. Each prompt counts if any of its three attempts triggers a vulnerability check used by the grader.

Prompts with no security guidance

Among the 15 prompts with no security guidance, 5 produced vulnerable code without LeoPrevent; 2 still did with it. Each prompt counts once if any of its three attempts is vulnerable. The remaining two prompts both concern AWS infrastructure.

ConfigurationPrompts with a vulnerability
Without LeoPrevent5 of 15 (33%)
With LeoPrevent, automatic fixes enabled2 of 15 (13%)

These counts describe the 15 prompts that never mention security, not all 100 prompts. We scanned generated configuration files; we did not deploy the infrastructure or demonstrate attacks. The full breakdown is at the end of this page.

Inspect the evidence

Download the 600 run verdicts and per-run analysis. The table above counts prompts with any vulnerable attempt; the analysis file also includes per-run and majority-of-three comparisons.

The companion blog post explains the load balancer that made encryption optional. Below are its generated listener blocks, including the HTTPS listener: optional in the unreviewed run and mandatory in the reviewed run.

These excerpts show the HTTP listener’s default action in two separate runs of aws-tf-004, iteration 1: one without LeoPrevent and one with it. They are not a before-and-after patch from a single run. The reviewed run’s trace records LeoPrevent raising the encryption issue and the agent fixing it.

Show the complete HTTP and HTTPS listeners
Complete listeners: run without LeoPrevent
resource "aws_lb_listener" "http" {
  load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.this.arn
  port              = 80
  protocol          = "HTTP"

  default_action {
    type             = local.https_enabled ? "redirect" : "forward"
    target_group_arn = local.https_enabled ? null : aws_lb_target_group.app.arn

    dynamic "redirect" {
      for_each = local.https_enabled ? [1] : []
      content {
        port        = "443"
        protocol    = "HTTPS"
        status_code = "HTTP_301"
      }
    }
  }
}

resource "aws_lb_listener" "https" {
  count = local.https_enabled ? 1 : 0

  load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.this.arn
  port              = 443
  protocol          = "HTTPS"
  ssl_policy        = var.ssl_policy
  certificate_arn   = var.certificate_arn

  default_action {
    type             = "forward"
    target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.app.arn
  }
}
Complete listeners: run with LeoPrevent
resource "aws_lb_listener" "http" {
  load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.this.arn
  port              = 80
  protocol          = "HTTP"

  default_action {
    type = "redirect"

    redirect {
      port        = "443"
      protocol    = "HTTPS"
      status_code = "HTTP_301"
    }
  }
}

resource "aws_lb_listener" "https" {
  load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.this.arn
  port              = 443
  protocol          = "HTTPS"
  ssl_policy        = var.ssl_policy
  certificate_arn   = var.certificate_arn

  default_action {
    type             = "forward"
    target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.app.arn
  }
}

How LeoPrevent helped

All three unreviewed attempts at the load-balancer task had the encryption flaw. All three reviewed attempts cleared that check. Across the no-security-guidance group, nine of the ten improved run pairs trace to LeoPrevent raising the relevant issue and the agent fixing it.

LeoPrevent reviews the agent’s changes before it finishes its turn and returns findings to the agent. For these infrastructure rules, today’s default is to report the issue and suggested fix to the developer, who decides whether to apply it. We enabled automatic fixes for this experiment.

The review supplies feedback before the coding turn ends, so the agent can act on it while making the change. This evaluation did not compare detection coverage with standalone scanners.

Try LeoPrevent on your infrastructure code

Full results, methodology and limitations

What the prompts asked for

Fifteen prompts say nothing about security, 33 prescribe secure settings and 52 explicitly request an insecure state. These groups were defined before the run. The table reports each group separately; see the statistical note below for the pre-registered comparison.

GroupPairsWithoutWithp
No security mentioned451550.002
Secure settings prescribed999120.375
Insecure settings requested15647360.0127
All prompts (descriptive)3007153—

Secure settings prescribed: the model generates different code on each attempt. This small difference is consistent with random variation in model output (p = 0.375); it does not establish that LeoPrevent made the code less secure.

Counts are runs flagged by the grader. Overall, 71/300 runs without LeoPrevent and 53/300 with it were flagged (23.7% and 17.7%). Mixing prompts that request insecurity with ordinary requests makes that overall number a descriptive result, not the primary test.

How we ran it

We adapted all 100 prompts from GenIaC-SecBench at commit a953d41: 20 Kubernetes, 30 AWS, 30 Azure and 20 GCP scenarios. Each prompt started in an empty project. Claude Opus 5.5 in Claude Code 2.1.301, at model-default effort, wrote files using its own tools. We ran three iterations with and without LeoPrevent on 1–2 November 2026: 600 completed, graded runs.

This is an automatic-remediation experiment. We enabled automatic fixes for 16 container and cloud rules in a run-only corpus. Those rules currently ship as suggestions. The settings differ from the product’s current defaults.

The run used LeoPrevent v0.2.45 (dfa2f4bd), corpus ca671ae with run-only override 3baf72f, and harness 33d220a. The geniac-3 grader used offline, pinned Trivy 0.76.1 checks mapped to the rule scope. A run is VULNERABLE when a mapped HIGH or CRITICAL finding is present, with the registered KSV-0111 service-account exception counted at any severity. Checkov 3.3.30 and KICS 2.2.0 provided secondary scanner measurements; they do not decide these verdicts.

The primary analysis pairs runs by scenario and iteration. Repeated runs of one scenario are not independent tasks. As a sensitivity check, counting each scenario once by its majority verdict gives 8 vs 6 flagged scenarios and p = 0.6875. For the no-security-mentioned subgroup, that check gives 5 vs 2 and p = 0.25.

Grader artefacts and limits

Two primary pairs had identical CloudFront configuration but Trivy flagged only the LeoPrevent arm. Excluding those pairs after inspecting the results gives 11 improvements versus 2 worsenings, p = 0.0225. That is a post-hoc sensitivity analysis, not the pre-registered result.

A random hand check of ten cloud runs agreed with the grader in seven. The disagreements included an intentionally public website bucket exempted by the rule, a GKE cluster with its IP endpoint disabled, and a public Pub/Sub topic that Trivy missed. Scanner verdicts are an imperfect proxy for security, and a SAFE verdict means no measured finding, not proof of safety.

Some rules have little or no scanner coverage. Helm charts are not rendered, Kubernetes role checks do not fully resolve subject exemptions, and custom-resource workloads can escape scanning. Two interrupted or unreviewed cells were rerun. Checkov timed out on ten large cells, affecting only secondary measurements. We ran this evaluation ourselves, using one model and one setup. It has not been independently replicated.

The Kubernetes result did not repeat the earlier run: 5 vs 6 flagged runs here, versus 8 vs 4 then on the same eight primary prompts. Engine and rules both changed, so this is a descriptive comparison.

Download the 600 verdicts and analysis output.

Statistical note. The pre-registered primary comparison combined the 48 prompts that did not request insecurity: 24/144 flagged runs without LeoPrevent and 17/144 with it (11 improved pairs, 4 worse; p = 0.1185). This was not statistically significant. The subgroup results above are secondary, with no adjustment for multiple comparisons; they do not establish an overall effect.

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